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RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF STATE TAXATION
UPON AIRLINES: ALOHA AIRLINES, INC. v.
DIRECTOR OF TAXATION
In seeking to increase state revenues without hurting domestic
business operations, state governments have refrained from raising
tax rates and, instead, have pursued the taxation of foreign business
activities occurring within their borders.' Although the taxation
power is regarded as essential to a state's existence,2 federal law often
regulates an area previously subject to state taxation and preempts
the state from taxation of the regulated activity.3 This occurred when
Congress passed section 7(a) of the Airport Development Accelera-
tion Act of 1973 (ADAA).4 The ADAA denied states the right to
raise revenues through the direct or indirect taxation of airline pas-
sengers,5 yet permitted states to levy airline taxes for general revenue-
raising purposes. Consequently, numerous states continued to levy
taxes under this general revenue-raising exception.6 In Aloha Air-
lines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation,7 the United States Supreme Court
dealt a blow to these general revenue-raising rights by holding that
the ADAA preempted a Hawaii general revenue-raising tax' upon an
1. See generally L.K. HUBBELL, FISCAL CRISIS IN AMERICAN CITIES: THE FED-
ERAL RESPONSE 3-24 (1979).
2. Chief Justice John Marshall stated in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824): "The power of taxation is indispensable to their [the states'] existence, and is a
power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in, and being exercised by
different authorities at the same time." Id. at 199.
3. For an explanation of the methods of federal preemption, see infra notes 29-32
and accompanying text.
4. Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 7(a), 87 Stat. 88, 90 (1973) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 1513 (1982)) [hereinafter referred to as the ADAA or the Act]. For the effect
of the 1982 amendment upon § 1513, see infra note 44.
5. For relevant text of 49 U.S.C. §§ 1513(a), (b) (1982), see infra note 44.
6. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(b) allows general revenue-raising taxes such as personal prop-
erty taxes, franchise taxes, net income taxes, and sales and use taxes. For relevant text
of the statute, see infra note 44.
7 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983).
8. For the text of the Hawaii taxing statute, see infra note 11.
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airline's gross receipts.
Aloha Airlines, Inc. is a Hawaii corporation engaged in the interis-
land air transportation of persons, property, and mail within Ha-
waii.9 Hawaii law classified Aloha Airlines as a "Public Service
Company"1 and subjected it to a Public Service Tax of four percent
upon its gross receipts." Aloha Airlines challenged the constitution-
ality of the tax in light of the ADAA' z and filed its tax returns show-
ing no liability.13 The Hawaii Director of Taxation (Director) then
made assessments consistent with the unpaid tax. 4 Aloha Airlines
appealed to the Hawaii Tax Appeal Court which concluded that the
Director had made proper assessments and that the Public Service
Tax was both a "property tax and a general tax."15 On appeal, the
Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed,' 6 holding that the tax violated
neither the commerce clause 17 nor the supremacy clause' 8 of the Fed-
9. 104 S. Ct. 291, 293 (1983).
10. Hawaii law includes all public utilities within the definition of Public Service
Companies. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-2 (1976). Prior to 1981, a public utility in-
cluded "any person, insofar as such person owns or operates an aerial transportation
enterprise as a common carrier." HAWAII REV. STAT. § 269-1 (1976). In 1981, the
state legislature amended § 269-1 to remove air common carriers from the definition
of public utilities. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 269-1 (Supp. 1983). Aloha Airlines and
other air common carriers remain liable for the tax levied by HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 239-6 (1976). For the text of § 239-6, see infra note 11.
11. The statute reads, in pertinent part:
§ 239-6 Airlines, certain carriers. There shall be levied and assessed upon each
airline a tax of four percent of its gross income each year from the airline busi-
ness; . . . The tax imposed by this section is a means of taxing the personal
property of the airline or other carrier, tangible and intangible, including going
concern value, and is in lieu of the tax imposed by chapter 237, but not in lieu of
any other tax.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6 (1976) (emphasis in original).
12. See infra note 44.
13. Aloha Airlines filed amended returns for 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976 and its
initial 1977 return showing no tax liability. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Hawaii 1, 5,
647 P.2d 263, 267 (1982), rev'dsub nom. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation,
104 S. Ct. 291 (1983).
14. 65 Hawaii at 5, 647 P.2d at 267. Also, the claims for refund on Aloha's
amended returns were denied. Id
15. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc. ST. TAx REP. [Hawaii] (CCH) t 200-118 (Hawaii
Tax App. Ct. June 6, 1978).
16. 65 Hawaii 1, 647 P.2d 263 (1982).
17. The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
18. Article VI of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
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eral Constitution. 9 The United States Supreme Court reversed, de-
claring that the ADAA preempted the tax.2"
The traditional constitutional attack upon state taxation of inter-
state commerce arises from the commerce clause.2' Prior to 1977,
courts treated state taxation of interstate commerce as regulatory in
nature and in conffict with Congress' power to regulate commerce.22
Courts held that taxes on the privilege of doing business in interstate
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19. 65 Hawaii 1, 13, 19, 647 P.2d 263, 271, 275 (1982), rev'd sub nom. Aloha Air-
lines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983).
20. 104 S. Ct. 291, 295 (1983).
21. For text of the commerce clause, see supra note 17. Congress has the sole
power to regulate interstate commerce, and any state tax upon interstate commerce
regulates interstate commerce. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the development of judicial commerce clause analysis of state taxation). Several
approaches have been taken by the Supreme Court. The state tax might discriminate
against interstate or foreign commerce and thus be invalid. See Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328-32 (1977). Similarly, the risk of multiple taxa-
tion might not be borne by similar local commerce. See Evco v. Jones, 409 U.S. 91,
93-94 (1972). The state tax could apportion unfairly income or property to more than
one state. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 329 (1968).
Finally, a tax is invalid if there is an absence of due process jurisdiction to tax. See
McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 328-30 (1944); Lockhart, Revolution in
State Taxation of Commerce, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1025, 1029 (1981).
22. Prior to the drafting of the commerce clause, the framers of the Constitution
suggested that interstate commerce should be immune from state taxation. See gener-
ally Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974
Term." Standard Pressed Steel andColonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149 (1976). On
various occasions the Supreme Court expressed its desire to insulate interstate com-
merce from state taxation. To the Court, state taxation usurped Congress' exclusive
commerce regulatory power. See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888);
Reading R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872); Reading R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
Although other bases existed for striking down state taxes, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text, this viewpoint survived for more than a century until Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). See infra notes 25-28 and accompa-
nying text. Immunity from state taxation served as the basis for disallowing many
types of state taxes. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951) (excise tax on the privilege of doing business); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249
(1946) (gross receipts tax on interstate sales); McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327 (1944) (retail sales tax applied to interstate sales in the buyer's state).
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commerce were unconstitutional per se,23 and sustained only privi-
lege taxes upon doing business within a state.24 This strict view of
state taxation was reversed in 1977 when the United States Supreme
Court decided Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady25 and held that
the validity of a state tax depends upon its "practical effect."26 In
Complete Auto the Supreme Court held that a state may require inter-
state commerce to pay its fair share of the cost of state government.27
The Court determined that a state tax does not violate the commerce
clause when it is applied to an interstate activity 1) with a substantial
nexus within the taxing state; 2) that is fairly apportioned; 3) that
does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and 4) that is
fairly related to services provided by the state.2"
When Congress enacts legislation that regulates interstate com-
merce, state taxation must not only survive commerce clause chal-
23. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 608-10 (1951).
24. The courts sustained numerous taxes on the premise that interstate business
had to pay its share of local government expenses. Only taxes found as sufficiently
remote from interstate commerce, however, proved valid. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 219-30 (1980) (gross receipts tax); Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 601-
02 (1954) (property taxes); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S.
33, 48-59 (1940) (retail sales tax); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 254 (1938) (privilege taxes on intrastate activities); Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., Inc. 300 U.S. 577, 582 (1937) (compensatory use tax on goods acquired through
an interstate transaction).
25. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
26. Id. at 278.
27. Id. at 287-89.
28. Id. at 287.
As stated by Lockhart, this four-part test represents a consolidation of previously
used tests, each of which contains a complex set of factors. They are as follows:
1) "Substantial Nexus," see, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of
Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); 2) "Fairly Apportioned," see, e.g.,
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968); 3) "Dis-
crimination," see, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977);
and 4) "Related to Services," see, e.g., Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of
Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975). LOCKHART, supra note 21, at 1037.
The Supreme Court clarified the test's fourth prong in Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981). The Court held that there is no due process clause
requirement that the amount of general revenue taxes collected from an activity must
be reasonably related to that activity. Consequently, states have latitude in levying
general revenue taxes. Id. at 622. The framers did not intend the commerce clause to
relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burdens
even though it increases the cost of doing business. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
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lenges, but also supremacy clause challenges. 29 If the federal
legislation does not expressly preempt the state taxation power, the
courts must look to other factors that demonstrate congressional in-
tent.3" There is no formalized test similar to the commerce clause
analysis in Complete Auto to determine whether a state provision is
preempted by reason of the supremacy clause. Instead, as stated in
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,3' courts must probe the nature of the
federal enactment as well as the area sought to be regulated before
declaring the state's action preempted under the supremacy clause.32
Congress passed the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 33 to provide for the expansion and improvement 34 of the na-
tion's airways and airports.35  Funding for the Act's programs
originated from federal taxes upon airline passenger tickets.36 Prior
29. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-74 (1941).
30. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
31. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
32. Federal regulation may be so pervasive that a "reasonable inference" might
exist to conclude that Congress left no room for states to supplement it. See Clover-
leaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 167-69 (1942); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919). The congressional enactment may
touch a field that the federal system predominates so as to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-74 (1941).
In addition, the objective of the federal legislation and the character of obligations
imposed by it may indicate the same legislative purpose. See Napier v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 608-13 (1926); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Winfield,
244 U.S. 147, 148-54 (1917); Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co.,
237 U.S. 597, 603-04 (1915); Southern Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439,
445-48 (1915). Finally, the state policy may produce a result that is inconsistent with
the federal statute. Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538, 541-43 (1945).
33. Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219 (1970), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976),
repealed by Pub. L. 97-248, Title V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 671 (1982) (current version at 49
U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)).
34. 49 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970).
35. Congress had found that the nation's airways and airports were inadequate to
deal with current and potential aviation growth:
Over the past 5 years, the certified air carrier fleet has increased from a substan-
tially piston fleet of 2,079 aircraft to an almost completely jet fleet of 2,586 air-
craft. In terms of capacity, the seat miles flown have increased from 94.8 billion
seat miles to 210 billion. By 1980 it is estimated that the domestic certified air-
lines will enplane 420 million passengers, almost tripling the 1969 figure.
H.R. REP. No. 601, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3047, 3051.
36. The Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, § 208, 84 Stat.
236, 250-52 (1970), established a trust fund for the ADAA's expenditures. The fund
received revenues from an 8% tax on domestic airline tickets, a $3.00 charge upon
1984]
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to the 1970 enactment, some states had attempted to levy head taxes37
on enplaning passengers in order to fund their own airport improve-
ment programs. 38 The passage of the Act threatened federal preemp-
tion of these head taxes. In Evansville- Vanderburgh AirportlAuthority
District v. Delta Airlines, InC.3 9 the United States Supreme Court
ended the confusion temporarily when it declared constitutional a
one-dollar state head tax on enplaning passengers.40
The decision in Evansville Airport sparked an increase in the
number of new airport head taxes.41 Congress, which had not ex-
international flight tickets, and a 5% tax on air freight. Pub. L. 91-258, §§ 4261, 4271,
84 Stat. 236, 238-40 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4261, 4271 (1982)).
37. "Head Money" is defined as "[a] sum of money reckoned at a fixed amount
for each head (person) in a designated class." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (5th ed.
1979).
38. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422A3 (1983).
Even after enactment of the ADAA of 1970, the United States' share of the costs of
an airport or airway improvement program could not exceed 50% of the allowable
project costs. 49 U.S.C. § 1717 (1970). Two years later this section was amended to
increase the allowable United States' share of costs to 75%. 49 U.S.C. § 1717 (Supp.
III 1973), repealedby Pub. L. 97-248, Title V, § 523(a), 96 Stat. 695 (1982). Presently,
fund apportionment is based upon the number of enplaning passengers at a local
airport. 49 U.S.C. § 2206 (1982).
39. 405 U.S. 707 (1972). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
tax based upon its practical effect and not upon its computation formula. Id. at 716,
In doing so, the Supreme Court held that states may constitutionally charge interstate
and domestic users of state-provided facilities a reasonable fee to defray the costs of
the facilities' maintenance. Id. at 714.
In addition, the Supreme Court distinguished Crandal v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 35 (1867), an earlier case that had disallowed a head tax on passengers riding
private railroads that passed through Utah. The Supreme Court noted that in Cran-
dall the head tax was imposed upon private railroads and their passengers, and not
related to state-provided facilities. 405 U.S. at 712. This tax deprived passengers of
the benefits of the State tax. Id In EvansvilleAirport, the local government adminis-
tered a head tax in a public airport upon passengers who enjoyed the benefits of the
airport maintenance paid for by such funds. Id at 709. A facility provided at public
expense aids, rather than hinders, travel. Id. at 714.
40. For state court decisions prior to EvansvileAirport holding head taxes uncon-
stitutional, see, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 154
Mont. 352, 463 P.2d 470 (1970) (one dollar enplaning charge held unconstitutional);
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 110 N.J. Super. 54, 264 A.2d 268 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1970) (service charge on enplaning passengers held unconstitutional).
41. As of 1972, several jurisdictions either had head taxes ranging from $.50 to
$3.00 or were considering legislation to establish similar changes. See H.R. REP. No.
1279, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972).
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pected the Supreme Court to rule the head tax constitutional,42 re-
acted by passing the Airport Development Acceleration Act of
1973,4 3 which included a prohibition against airport head taxes. The
statute explicitly prohibited state taxation of persons traveling by air
transportation.' In addition, it proscribed taxation of the "carriage"
of air travelers, the sale of such transportation, and the resulting gross
receipts. 45 Congress left intact a state's right to levy other taxes for
42. See S. REP. No. 12, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1973). The Senate Report reads,
in pertinent part:
[The Senate Commerce] Committee never intended that air travelers would be
subject to state and local head taxes as well as to national user charges. The
Committee believed there was no danger of this because the basic constitutional
guarantee of a citizen's right to unhindered interstate travel, and a U.S. Supreme
Court decision which had prevailed since 1867, indicated such taxes could not be
constitutionally imposed. It is unfair that this is happening now since state and
local head taxes constitute an inequitable, double burden of taxation on air
passengers.
Id. at 21 (referring to Crandall v. Nebraska, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867)).
Congress also voiced a concern over the inflexibility of the head tax. First, the head
tax would penalize those passengers in smaller cities that would have to use connect-
ing flights and enplane more than once. Hearings on S. 2397, S. 3611, and S. 3755
Before the Subcomnm on Aiation of the Senate Comnm on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 137 (1972). (comment of W. Gillilland, Vice-Chairman, Civil Aeronautics
Board). Second, the fixed fee, when applied to small fares, would constitute a sub-
stantial increase in the fare as opposed to the increase to a higher-priced ticket. Id at
175. (statement of R. Sorlien, Vice-President of Altair Airlines, Inc.).
43. Pub. L. No. 93-44, § 7(a), 87 Stat. 88, 90 (1973) (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. § 1513 (1982)).
44. 49 U.S.C. § 1513 (1976). In 1982, Congress amended § 1513 to address local
property taxes that unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate com-
merce. Although the amendment has no bearing upon the proceedings in Aloha Air-
lines, it still provides valuable insight into congressional intent as to the types of
permissible taxes upon air commerce.
The amendment, in relevant part, prohibits a state from levying property taxes that:
I)(A) assess air carrier transportation at a value that has a higher ratio to the
true market value of air carrier transportation property than the ratio that the
assessed value of other commercial and industrial property of the same type in
the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other com-
mercial and industrial property. ...
(C) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on air carrier transportation
property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and
industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction.
3) This subsection shall not apply to any in lieu tax which is wholly utilized
for airport and aeronautical purposes.
49 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (1982).
45. Id.
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general revenue-raising purposes. 46 As a result of this enactment, the
ADAA preempted numerous state head tax schemes.47
Although the Hawaii statute48 designates the airline tax as a "per-
sonal property tax,"' 49 it is computed upon the gross receipts of an
airline5" and is in lieu of an excise tax.-' The valuation of property
by a gross receipts method has been successful in the valuation of
46. Id. § 1513(b).
47. See, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 453 Pa. 181, 309
A.2d 157 (1973) (head tax on deplaning and enplaning passengers held unconsti-
tutional).
48. See supra note 11 for the text of HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6.
49. Beginning in 1933, Hawaii classified airlines as public utilities and subjected
them to a Public Utility Tax upon their gross receipts. 1927 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act
100. Twenty years later, the Hawaii legislature removed airlines from the Public Util-
ity Tax but subjected them to the General Excise Tax Law. 1953 Hawaii Sess. Laws
Act 279. (The General Excise Tax is discussed infra at note 51.). Finally, in 1963,
airlines were reclassified as Public Service Companies along with public utilities and
subjected to the redesignated Public Service Tax. 1963 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 147,
§ 2(a). As of 1982, airlines are no longer classified as Public Service Companies but
are still subject to the tax. See supra note 10. Presently, airlines are subject to a flat
tax rate applied against their "gross income" under HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6.
"Gross Income" means gross income derived from public service business defined
as follows: "(B) [giross income from the transportation of passengers or freight...
by land or water or air. . . [o]riginating and terminating within this State." Id. The
statute has been amended by HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-2(6) (Supp. 1977).
50. See supra note 11 for text of HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6. Hawaii has not had
a personal property tax since 1947. A personal property tax that existed prior to 1932
did include the following provision: "In estimating the aggregate value of each such
enterprise for profit, there shall be taken into consideration the net profits made by
the same, also the gross receipts . . . as well as all other facts and considerations
which reasonably. . .bear on such valuation." 1921 Hawaii Sess. Law Act 250, codi-
fied at REV. LAW HAWAII § 1320 (1925) (now HAWAII REV. STAT.) (repealed 1932).
51. The exact language of HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6 is "in lieu of the tax im-
posed by Chapter 237." See supra note 11 for the text of § 239-6.
Chapter 237 is the General Excise Tax Law, HAWAII REV. STAT. § 237 (1976 &
Supp. 1983). The chapter levies "privilege taxes against persons on account of their
business and other activities in the State measured by the application of rates against
values of products, gross proceeds of sales, or gross income, whichever is speci-
fied ... " HAWAII REV. STAT. § 237-13 (Supp. 1983).
Although there is a conflict in terms between the chapter's title "General Excise
Tax Laws" and the assessing section's labeling of the tax as a "privilege tax," the
operation of the tax and not the description will control its meaning. See Herman v.
City of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 198, 55 A.2d 491, 495 (1947). Excise taxes are im-
posed upon manufacture, sale, or consumption of commodities, upon licenses to pur-
sue certain occupations, and upon corporate privileges. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,
220 U.S. 107 (1911); Blaustein v. Levin, 176 Md. 423, 4 A.2d 861 (1939).
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public utilities. 2 Yet, labeling of a tax as a personal property tax
does not determine its true character.53 Although some weight is
given to a tax's title,54 courts look to the operation of the statute in
order to determine a tax's charactery.5
The Hawaii Supreme Court utilized the four-part commerce clause
test as described in Complete Auto.5 6 Aloha Airlines protested that
the state tax did not meet the fourth prong of the test, asserting that
"the tax was not fairly related to the services provided by the
52. The United States Supreme Court has allowed the gross receipts method for
property valuation. See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co. v. Minnesota, 246 U.S. 450 (1918);
United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U.S. 335 (1912).
Hawaii courts followed these holdings and determined that the Hawaii Public Util-
ity Tax imposed a tax similar to the ad valorem real and personal property taxes
otherwise imposed. Hawaii Consol. Ry. v. Borthwick, 34 Hawaii 269, 281 (1937),
af'd, 105 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1939) (public utility found subject to the gross receipts
tax). In Consolidated Railway, however, the Hawaii Supreme Court noted that the
tax's similarity to an "ad valorem tax" originated from its computation based on the
ratio obtained between the net and gross income of the utility business and not based
on a flat rate. Id Contrary to this rationale, the present Hawaii Public Service Tax
on airlines does not use a variable rate, but a flat one. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6
(1976 & Supp. 1983). See supra note 11.
Some courts have held that excise taxes passed on to consumers "may or may not
have an ad valorem factor therein." Powell v. Gleason, 50 Ariz. 542, 548, 74 P.2d 47,
50 (1937). But see Herman v. City of Baltimore, 189 Md. 191, 197, 55 A.2d 491, 495
(1947) (excise taxes never can be property taxes because the latter are based on own-
ership alone).
Public utility property traditionally is difficult to value because the majority of the
property is capitalized in stock and bonds with variable market values. Luce, Assess-
ment of Real Propertyfor Taxation, 35 MICH. L. REv. 1217, 1233 (1937). Yet, the
gross income method of valuation (similar to HAWAII REV. STAT. § 239-6) has re-
sulted in a reasonable and efficient method of valuing public utility property. See
Ravage, Valuation of Public Utilitiesfor Ad Valorem Taxation, 41 YALE L.J. 487, 514-
17 (1932).
53. See, e.g., Storoasli v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 57, 62-63 (1931).
54. In determining the nature of a tax, the statute's labeling of the tax's character
is a relevant factor. See, e.g., Lutz v. Arnold, 208 Ind. 480, 491, 193 N.E. 840, 844
(1955). Some courts have held the effect should be (at least) persuasive. See, e.g.,
George E. Breece Lumber Co. v. Mirabal, 34 N.M. 643, 647, 287 P. 699, 700 (1930),
aF'dper curiam, 283 U.S. 788 (1931). Also, the opinion of a state court of the tax's
nature is given due weight, but is not conclusive. See, e.g., Society for Savings in the
City of Cleveland v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143, 151-54 (1955).
55. See, e.g., Educational Films Corp. of Am. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379, 387 (1931).
56. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Hawaii 1, 12, 647 P.2d 263, 271 (1982) (citing
Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)), rev'd sub nom. Aloha Airlines, Inc. v.
Director of Taxation, 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983). See also text accompanying notes 25-28
(four-part Complete Auto test).
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State."57 The court rejected Aloha Airline's contention, noting that
the revenue collected from the tax on airline activity helped to create
a trained work force and a civilized society." These benefits relate to
the state tax that the Hawaii statute imposed.59
The Hawaii Supreme Court also held that the Hawaii tax did not
conflict with the ADAA's prohibition against gross receipts taxes.60
The court noted that the ADAA prohibited state and local charges on
air commerce but allowed a wide variety of other state and local
taxes. 6' The court labeled this process as a paradox in the statute
which reflected congressional intent not to prohibit all state taxation
of air transportation. 62 Noting the federal preemption rules used in
Rice,6 3 the court found determinative the fact that the ADAA did
57. 65 Hawaii at 12, 647 P.2d at 271. Aloha Airlines asserted that the tax receipts
derived from HAWAI REv. STAT. § 239-6 did not directly fund airport and airline
activities but, instead, funded general government costs. Id.
58. Id The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that in Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that there is no
requirement for the state taxes derived from a particular activity to reasonably relate
to the value of services provided to that activity. 65 Hawaii at 12, 647 P.2d at 271
(quoting Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. 609, 622 (1981)). Thus, Aloha Airlines
must pay its fair share of the costs to provide "a trained work force and the advan-
tages of a civilized society." 65 Hawaii at 13, 647 P.2d at 271 (quoting Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979)).
59. 65 Hawaii at 13, 647 P.2d at 271.
60. Id at 13-19, 647 P.2d at 271-75.
61. Id at 16, 647 P.2d at 273.
62. Id at 16-17, 647 P.2d at 273-74. The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that the
"paradox" of the ADAA's allowance of general revenue taxes in § 1513(b), see sutra
text accompanying note 48, and its disallowance of other direct taxes in § 1513(a), see
supra text accompanying note 44, necessitated a deeper analysis of the statute's pur-
pose. Id
63. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
The Hawaii Supreme Court began with an analysis similar to that used by the
United States Supreme Court in Rice when it first noted that a state's taxation power
is essential to its existence. Id at 14, 647 P.2d at 272 (quoting Gibbins v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824)). See supra note 2. Thus, when a federal statute does
not expressly preempt a state taxation power, the courts must presume that the statute
did not intend to supersede the state tax. Aloha Airlines, 65 Hawaii at 15, 647 P.2d at
273.
In addition, the Court noted that the purpose of § 1513 was to protect the primary
source of revenue for the Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970. Id at 17, 647
P.2d at 274. The legislative history of § 1513, see supra notes 41-43 and accompany-
ing text, indicated congressional annoyance with head taxes that appeared to burden
interstate commerce. 65 Hawaii at 17, 647 P.2d at 274. The Hawaii Supreme Court
did reason, however, that § 1513's prohibition of head taxes attempted to prevent
state encroachment upon Congress' source of revenue. Id
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allow for general revenue-raising taxes,64 and that the tax levied by
the Hawaii statute had some attributes similar to a property tax.65
The court sustained the tax, holding that the Hawaii airline tax did
not attempt to regulate airlines66 and did not frustrate the purpose of
the ADAA.
67
The dissent in Aloha Airlines focused on the majority's cursory
treatment of the literal conflict of the Hawaii statute's tax upon gross
receipts with the ADAA's prohibition of state taxes upon airline gross
receipts.6" The dissent stated that conflict in itself should render the
Hawaii tax unconstitutional by means of preemption.69 Further-
more, the dissent noted that the Hawaii tax had none of the attributes
of any past Hawaii property taxes and implied that the characteriza-
tion of the tax in this manner merely served as a legislative means to
avoid federal preemption.7 °
In a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme Court over-
turned the Hawaii Supreme Court's ruling and held that the ADAA
expressly preempted the Hawaii tax.7 ' The Court held that the
ADAA unambiguously disallowed state taxes upon the gross receipts
of airlines and that the Hawaii Supreme Court had erred in looking
beyond the plain language of the statute to determine Congress' pur-
pose.72 Furthermore, the Court held that nothing in the legislative
history of the ADAA implied a congressional purpose to limit the
64. Id. at 17, 647 P.2d at 273. See supra text accompanying note 48.
65. Id. at 17, 647 P.2d at 274. The Hawaii Supreme Court noted that in Hawaii
Consol. Ry. v. Borthwick, 34 Hawaii 269 (1937), aI'd, 105 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1939), its
territorial predecessor had held that the Public Utility Tax based upon gross receipts
was a fair and reasonable method of computing property value. 65 Hawaii at 17, 647
P.2d at 268 (quoting Hawaii Consol. Ry. v. Borthwick, 34 Hawaii 269, 280, 281
(1937), aft'd, 105 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1939). See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying
text.
66. 65 Hawaii at 18, 647 P.2d at 275.
67. Id. at 18, 647 P.2d at 275.
68. Id. at 20, 647 P.2d at 275-76.
69. Id. at 20, 647 P.2d at 275.
70. Id. at 20, 647 P.2d at 275-76.
71. 104 S. Ct. 291 (1983).
72. Id. at 294. The Court did not find, as did the Hawaii Supreme Court, a "para-
dox" in § 1513. The Court stated that § 1513(a) preempted specifically some state
airline taxes, including gross receipts taxes, while § 1513(b) allowed some general rev-
enue taxes which were not preempted expressly in § 1513(a). Id. at 294 n.6. The
Court did not explain the distinction between gross receipts taxes and those taxes
described in § 1513(b).
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preemptive effect of the Act to airline passenger taxes. 73 Finally, the
Court disagreed with Hawaii's claim that the Hawaii tax should es-
cape preemption because of its characterization as a personal prop-
erty tax.74 The Court noted that the Hawaii Legislature's description
of the tax was not unclear in its purpose and intended effect of levy-
ing a tax upon the gross receipts of airlines. 75
As the Court stated correctly,76 and the Hawaii Supreme Court at-
tempted to avoid,77 the method of computing the Hawaii tax78 con-
flicted directly with the ADAA's prohibition against gross receipt
taxes.79 Although Congress did provide for the continuance of some
general revenue-raising taxes upon airlines," ° it clearly prohibited
any gross receipts tax." Although no legislative history exists that
73. Id. at 294-95. The Court also noted that during the House hearings on the
ADAA, an Ohio congressman suggested expanding § 1513(b) to allow "gross receipts
taxes fairly apportioned to a State." Id. at 294 n.7 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 4082
before the Subcomm. on Transportation andAeronautics of the House Comm. on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., 246-53 (1973)). Subsequently,
when Congress passed § 1513(b) without the change, the Ohio Attorney General con-
cluded that this preempted Ohio's gross receipts tax. Id. (citing Ohio Op. Atty. Gen.
73-117 (Nov. 20, 1973)).
74. 104 S. Ct. at 295.
75. Id.
76. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 56-67 and accompanying text. Although the Hawaii Supreme
Court cited authority holding that the Public Utility Tax was similar to a personal
property tax, the court did not address the issue whether an airline is properly classi-
fied as a "public utility." See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Public utilities,
unlike airlines, have a substantial amount of their assets in bonds. See supra note 52.
This sometimes necessitates the use of a gross receipts valuation method. See gener-
aly Ravage, Valuation of Public Utiities for Ad Valorem Taxation, 41 YALE L.J. 487
(1932).
In addition, the § 239-6 tax is "in lieu of the taxes imposed by Chapter 237" which
are general excise taxes and not property taxes. See supra notes 50-54. Although
excise taxes are permissible under § 1513(b), § 1513(a) still prohibits any tax com-
puted upon an airline's gross receipts. See supra text accompanying note 45. But see
infra note 81.
78. See supra notes 11, 48-50 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
81. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court stated that the
express prohibition of gross receipts taxes in § 1513 precluded any further preemption
tests. 104 S. Ct. at 295 n.10. Also problematic is that § 1513(b) permits sales and use
taxes on the sale of goods or services, yet § 1513(a) prevents gross receipt taxes. The
Court's interpretation of Congress' blanket intention to disallow all taxes based upon
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manifests Congress' intention of prohibiting gross receipts taxes, s2
Congress made the choice to disallow such taxes and congressional
intent must be followed. 3 Thus, general revenue-raising taxes based
upon an airline's gross receipts are unconstitutional in light of the
ADAA. s4
After Aloha Airlines, all state taxes computed upon the gross re-
ceipts of airlines are subject to preemption by the ADAA.85 Even if
the tax more closely resembles a permissible general revenue-raising
tax that other interstate businesses bear equally,8 6 as opposed to a
head tax upon airlines and their passengers, 7 the Court's holding in
Aloha Airlines declares these taxes preempted and invalid.88 It will
take congressional action to clarify the prohibition upon gross re-
ceipts taxes before states may raise additional revenue utilizing a
gross receipts falters in the attempt to characterize a sales or use tax that is not nor-
mally computed upon gross receipts.
82. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Hawaii Supreme Court agreed
that Congress enacted the ADAA in response to Evansville Airport. See 104 S. Ct. at
292-93; 65 Hawaii at 9, 647 P.2d at 274. In Evansville Airport, the Supreme Court held
state airport head taxes permissible under the ADAA. See supra text accompanying
notes 39-43. Yet, neither court could explain Congress' reason for differentiating be-
tween gross receipts taxes and the permissible general revenue-raising taxes of
§ 1513(b). See 104 S. Ct. at 294; 65 Hawaii at 9, 647 P.2d at 273-74.
Additional insight as to why Congress chose the § 1513 language "direct or indirect
. and upon gross income" is taken from Evansville Airport. The Supreme Court
stated the following as to the manner of levying the head tax:
[W]e do not think it particularly important whether the [h]ead charge is imposed
on the passenger himself, to be collected by the airline, or on the airline to be
passed on to the passenger ifit chooses. In either case, it is the act of enplanement
and the consequent use of runways and other airport facilities that give rise to the
obligation.
405 U.S. 707, 714 (emphasis added).
Evansville Airport ignited congressional action. It follows that Congress utilized the
above language from Evansville Airport to ensure that states would not apply any type
of head tax upon airlines or their passengers. See supra note 42.
83. See 104 S. Ct. at 295 n.10. The Supreme Court noted that Congress may
amend § 1513 if it believes its preemptive effect on state taxes is too broad. Id.
84. The Supreme Court did not analyze the Hawaii Supreme Court's commerce
clause arguments, but dealt only with the federal preemption issue. See 104 S. Ct. at
294. In light of Complete Auto and Commonwealth Edison, interstate commerce must
pay its fair share of the state costs in the forum of its business activities. See supra
notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
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gross receipts tax upon airlines. 89
Branko J. Marusic
89. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text.
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